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CHAPTER 16 
Insurance 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§16.1. Physical damage insurance: Construction of policy. During 
the 1962 SURVEY year an unusual number of cases requiring construc-
tion of particular policy terms came before the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Three such cases involved various types of physical damage 
policies. In the first of these, Sherman v. Employers' Liability Assur-
ance Corp.,! the plaintiff insured sought to bring within the protection 
of a fire insurance policy covering property of the insured's laundry 
and cleaning customers while in the insured's premises, in the custody 
of the insured's collecting agencies or branch stores, or "in transit," 
a loss to property of the insured's customers caused by fire in the 
premises of an independent laundering company. The insured was in 
the business of collecting laundry and cleaning at its customers' homes 
and assembling, marking and checking the items at its premises, where 
they were picked up in bulk by the laundering company and taken 
to its premises for washing and cleaning. When this work was com-
pleted the goods were returned in bulk by the laundering company to 
the insured's premises, where they were sorted and redelivered by the 
insured to its customers. 
Excepting to the direction of a verdict for the defendant insurer, the 
insured argued that the case should have gone to the jury, which could 
have found that the goods at the time of their destruction were in 
the custody of its collecting agencies or, alternatively/'in transit." The 
Court found no ambiguity which would require the language of the 
policy to be construed against the insurer.2 The goods were not in 
charge of a collecting agency, but in the hands of an independent con-
tractor under a contractual obligation to the insured to clean or 
launder them. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the goods 
were "in transit" or that their presence on the premises of the launder-
ing company was a part of or incident to transportation.3 To hold 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE is Vice-President of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and 
Instructor in Law at Boston College Law School. 
§16.1. 1343 Mass. 354,178 N.E.2d 864 (1961). 
2 August A. Busch Be Co. of Massachusetts v. Liberty Mutual Insuran~Co., lI!19 
Mass. 239. 158 N.E.2d 351 (1959). discussed in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.1. 
S The various meanings of "in transit" are discussed in Koshland v. Columbia 
Insurance Co., 237 Mass. 467. 472-477.130 N.E. 41,43-45 (1921). 
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otherwise, in the opinion of the Court, would render meaningless the 
words of the policy designed to extend coverage to property while on 
the insured's premises or in movement under the insured's control be-
tween such premises and the customer. 
In Schroeder v. Federal Insurance Co.' the insurer sought to deny 
coverage under a policy of aircraft insurance for loss of a Beech 
Bonanza G-35 airplane owned by the insured, relying on a policy 
declaration that "[t]he aircraft will be operated only by ... [the in-
sured] and/or any duly certificated private pilot or better who has at 
least 250 hours total flying time 25 hours of which have been in a 
Beech Model 35 aircraft." A condition of the policy required the 
production of logbooks, kept as required by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, in support of claims made under the policy. A further condi-
tion specifically defined the word "flight" as used in the schedule of 
coverage. The question stipulated by the parties to the action was 
whether the pilot operating the airplane at the time of the accident 
had the requisite number of hours of flying time as set forth in the 
policy. 
One of the pilot's logbooks had disappeared and another was de-
stroyed by one of his infant children, but the trial judge after pre-
liminary findings ruled that secondary evidence could be introduced 
to prove the contents of the unavailable logbooks. In affirming the 
denial of a directed verdict for the insurer, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found that the production of logbooks (at the request of the insurer) 
was a condition precedent to recovery under the policy, but that this 
policy provision did not preclude proof of "flying time" by evidence 
other than the contents of logbooks. If only this special method of 
proof of flying time was to be permitted, the condition should have 
been expressly made applicable to the provision limiting operation of 
the aircraft to pilots with stated hours of flying experience. The 
Court also rejected the view that the words "flying time" as used in 
this provision were the equivalent of the term "flight" as defined in 
relevant federal regulations and used in the policy to express the cov-
erage afforded. 
The third case, Joseph E. Bennett Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Cool' involved various policies of fire insurance, each of which afforded 
extended coverage including coverage for loss by malicious mischief 
and vandalism. The policies provided: "When this policy covers build-
ings, it shall cover the basic structure and additions, including founda-
tions ... and ... shall include building service equipment ... and 
all property fastened to and made a part of the building." The policy 
further provided that permission is "granted to make additions, altera-
tions and repairs to the building or structure described; and this 
policy . . . shall also cover such additions, alterations or repairs when 
not otherwise covered by insurance." 
The policies as written specifically covered a clubhouse, pro shop 
'343 MaSll.472, 179 N.E.2d 328 (1962). 
11 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 505,181 N.E.2d 557. 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1962 [1962], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1962/iss1/19
§16.2 INSURANCE 195 
and two pump houses belonging to a country club. Subsequent to the 
issuance of some of the policies the clubhouse was reconstructed and 
the property was further improved by the construction of a swimming 
pool set in a concrete terrace in the rear of the clubhouse and con-
nected to the clubhouse by twelve to fifteen steps and a second con-
crete terrace extending the width of the building and thirty feet out 
from it. None of the policies purport to describe the swimming pool 
as property covered. The plaintiff sought to recover for very serious 
vandalism damage to the swimming pool, urging that the pool was an 
"addition" to the clubhouse within the alterations and repairs clauses 
of the policies. The Supreme Judicial Court took note of the require-
ment that ambiguous policy terms must be construed against the 
insurer, but found that the "term 'addition' most aptly describes an 
enlargement of what previously existed by a piece of construction of 
the same general character, having some definite connection and com-
munity of use with the basic building," and that the swimming pool 
was not such an addition. While a country club swimming pool may 
be said to be a structure, the usual "additions" clause of a fire insur-
ance policy applies only to buildings and not to adjacent facilities 
which are not buildings. 
§16.2. Disability insurance: Construction of policy. Two addi-
tional cases requiring the construction of policy language involved 
disability insurance. The plaintiff in MacArthur v. Massachusetts 
Hospital Service, Inc.1 sought a declaration as to his right to payment 
for hospital expenses under the terms of his "subscriber certificate" 
issued by the defendant "Blue Cross." The plaintiff was a municipal 
fireman who suffered personal injuries, resulting in hospital confine-
ment, while performing his duties at a fire under the direction of the 
chief of the fire department. The subscriber's certificate recited: "No 
credits shall be provided for services, care, or treatment for personal 
injuries or illness arising out of or in the course of employment or 
incurred in the line of duty, or for admissions to a hospital operated 
by any agency of the United States Government, or for any other 
services, when the member would be entitled to full or partial benefits 
under any municipal, State, or Federal law, regulation, or agency, if 
this contract were not in effect." The Supreme Judicial Court rejected 
the defendant's contentions that the plaintiff was not entitled to benefit 
payments because (1) he was injured in the line of duty, and (2) he was 
entitled to full or partial benefits under state law.2 
In order to bring the plaintiff's claim within the coverage the Court 
was constrained to read the quoted contractual provisions as though 
the words "when the member would be entitled to full or partial bene-
§16.2. 1M!! Mass. 670, 180 N.E.2d 449 (1962). 
2 General Laws, c. 41, §IOO, provides in part that a city "shall indemnify a .•. 
fireman or a member of the fire department ... to an amount not more than the 
amount recommended by the board or officer authorized to appoint ... firemen 
or members of the fire department of such city ... for expenses or damages sus· 
tained by him while acting as a . . . fireman .... " 
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fits under any municipal, State, or Federal law, regulation, or agency, 
if this contract were not in effect" related to each of the series of 
clauses preceding it. This reading is made possible by adverting to 
the comma appearing before the word "when," by inference suggesting 
that the absence of the punctuation mark would have required the 
opposite construction. Giving such weight to a punctuation mark 
overcomes the welI-established rule that in successive clauses a disjunc-
tive phrase of the last clause is not generally effective beyond its nearest 
antecedent.8 
Thus read the contract provision is said to deny benefits for injury 
suffered "in line of duty" if the injured person is "entitled to full or 
partial benefits" under state law. The benefits under state law, if 
any, to which the plaintiff may be entitled are those under G.L., c. 41, 
§IOO.4 It has been held that the obligation of the city under this 
statute is to indemnify the claimant to an amount not in excess of 
that recommended by the appointing officer and that nothing in the 
statute requires the appointing officer to make any recommendation. 
In the opinion of the Court the word "entitled" must be construed 
to mean that the injured person has a claim of right. Under the 
doctrine of the Fortin caseli the plaintiff in this case has no claim of 
right to indemnification from the city. 
By this circuitous route the Court was able to make a contract, which 
is intended to afford benefits for "non-occupational" injuries or illness, 
also afford benefits for an "occupational" injury. While it asserted 
that there is no doubt as to the meaning of the section in question, it 
nevertheless relied upon the doctrine that ambiguous language in a 
policy must be resolved in favor of the insured. Moreover, it asserted 
that, consistent with this principle, exclusionary language in a policy 
must be strictly construed so as not "to diminish the protection pur-
chased by the plaintiff," although there was no showing that the plain-
tiff purchased or thought he purchased anything more than the cover-
age grant for which the defendant argued. An interesting question 
would be presented if a similarly circumstanced plaintiff without any 
claim of right had nevertheless been indemnified by his municipal em-
ployer. As with so many cases of this kind it is difficult to see any other 
objective than to find a way to bring an un indemnified loss within the 
coverage of an insurance policy. 
In Dowdall v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Assn. of 
America,S the plaintiff sought to recover disability benefits under a 
8 Cushing v. Worrick. 9 Gray 382 (Mass. 1857); Perry v. J. L. Mott Iron Works 
Co .• 207 Mass. 501. 93 N.E. 798 (1911). Note also Greenough v. Phoenix Insurance 
Co .• 206 Mass. 247. 92 N.E. 447 (1910). in which a comma was used to support a 
construction that a qualifying clause modifies a more remote antecedent than the 
nearest. and Dowling v. Board of Assessors of Boston. 268 Mass. 480. 168 N.E. 73 
(1929). holding that the punctuation mark will not be allowed to produce a result 
which is inconsistent with the obvious purpose of the statutory language there in 
question as shown by the legislative history of the enactment. 
4 Quoted in part in note 2 supra. 
IS Fortin v. Mayor of Chicopee. 325 Mass. 214. 89 N.E.2d 760 (1950). 
81962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 477. 181 N.E.2d 594. 
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certificate issued by the defendant insurer which stated that benefits 
were payable only for disability "resulting from sickness or disease 
originating more than 30 days . . . after the effective date hereof." 
The certificate was issued on November 10, 1952, and apparently was 
issued to replace a certificate issued some twenty-one years earlier and 
had attached to it photostatic copies of the applications for both cer-
tificates. The benefits afforded by the replacement certificate were 
double thOse afforded by the replaced certificate. The plaintiff's dis-
ability was caused by multiple sclerosis, which originated subsequent 
to the effective date of the earlier certificate but prior to the effective 
date of the replacement certificate, but did not become known to the 
plaintiff until after the latter date. 
Knowledge of the existence of a disease on the part of the plaintiff 
is not required; it is enough that the disease had originated prior to 
the effective date of the certificate currently in force. The plaintiff 
was not entitled to recover under this certificate. Moreover, the plain-
tiff could not sustain the position that he should recover the benefits 
of the earlier certificate on the basis that the second certificate simply 
increased the benefits previously afforded. This conclusion seems in-
escapable in face of the provision reciting: "This certificate is issued 
in lieu of and supersedes all prior certificates issued by this Association 
to the member herein named, and this Association shall not after date 
hereof be liable for any loss or claim of any kind arising hereafter 
under or by reason of any certificate heretofore issued by it to said 
member." While a contract could be drawn to give the effect for 
which the plaintiff contended, unhappily this certificate was not so 
drawn. 
§16.3. Theft insurance: Locked car warranty. The plaintiff in 
Tumblin v. American Insurance CO.I had insured against fire and 
certain other perils tools and equipment stored in a utility trailer 
parked on certain land not owned by the plaintiff but adjacent to 
premises owned by him. This policy subsequent to its issuance was 
endorsed to cover the insured property against loss caused by the peril 
of theft. The policy was further endorsed to incorporate in it the 
"locked car warranty." 2 Thereafter the plaintiff's trailer was stolen. In 
order to bring his loss within the coverage of the policy, the plaintiff 
had to prove that the loss occurred by reason of "violent forcible entry." 
It was not enough to show the theft of the trailer because the policy did 
not purport to cover the loss of contents through theft of the trailer. 
Nor did it help the plaintiff to assert the likelihood that the thief 
would break into the trailer to obtain the contents. To recover he 
must prove that the loss was within the description of the risks covered. 
§16.4. Crime insurance: Dishonesty of employees. Liberty Mutual 
§16.!I. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 755,182 N.E.2d !l06. 
2 This provision recites that "This policy covers against theft from unattended 
vehicle only when directly resulting from violent forcible entry into vehicles equipped 
with bodies of entirely closed construction, provided the doors and other openings 
of such vehicles were closed and locked when the forcible entry and theft occurred." 
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Insurance Co. v. A. C. Martinelli Rogers Plastic Corp.! was a bill in 
equity to determine the rights and liabilities among all of the parties 
arising out of allegations that certain checks were fraudulently diverted 
by an employee of defendant Rogers, to whom the plaintiff insurer had 
issued a crime policy affording coverage against the "dishonest or fraud-
ulent" acts of its employees. There was testimony that Rogers had 
agreed to make loans from time to time to Ayer Chemicals, Inc., and 
did so through its employee by transferring to Ayer checks received by 
it from its customers. Ayer never repaid any of these loans and subse-
quently transferred all of its assets to defendant Puritan Chemical 
Corporation. Puritan did not assume Ayer's debts. On the vital facts 
this testimony was completely contrary to that presented on behalf of 
Rogers. The Supreme Judicial Court, holding that it was required to 
decide the case upon its own evaluation of the testimony, giving due 
weight to the findings of the trial judge, affirmed the decree of the 
Superior Court that the transferred checks were in fact loans and 
the insurer had no liability to Rogers under its policy. As between 
the parties, the only claim is that of Ayer for the repayment to Rogers 
of its indebtedness with interest. 
§16.5. Motor vehicle insurance: Board of appeal. With the enact-
ment of the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Law! the 
legislature created in the Department of Banking and Insurance a 
board of appeals on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds to hear, 
among other things, appeals from the actions of insurance companies 
in canceling or refusing to issue such policies or bonds. This board 
is made up of the Commissioner of Insurance and the Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles, or designated representatives, and an assistant attorney 
genera1.2 In Cieri v. Commissioner of Insurance/l the petitioner, the 
designee to the board of appeals of a Commissioner of Insurance whose 
term of office had expired, sought to retain his position and contended 
that he could be involuntarily removed, by virtue of the Veterans' 
Tenure Act,' only in accordance with the method prescribed by the 
civil service laws.1i The Supreme Judicial Court in disposing of this 
contention held that the petitioner's right to hold the office in question 
and to exercise its powers depended wholly upon the appointive power 
of the Commissioner of Insurance, who is powerless to give the ap-
pointee a tenure of office beyond his own. The Court held further that 
the time during which the appointee held over into the term of the 
successor commissioner, by whom he was not reappointed, could not, 
in any event, be counted in satisfying the three years in office required 
by the Veterans' Tenure Act to entitle the petitioner to a hearing 
before he can be involuntarily removed. 
§16.4. ! 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 967, 18!1 N.E.2d 106. 
§16.5. ! G.L., c. 90, §§IA, !l4A·!l4I, added by Acts of 1925, c. !l46. 
2 Id., c. 26, §8A, added by Acts of 1925, c. !\46, §!I. 
8 !l4!1 Mass. 181, 178 N.E.2d 77 (1961). 
, G.L., c. 30, §9A. 
Ii Id., c. !II, §§43, 45. 
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Having disposed of the case on these grounds, the Court was at pains 
to observe that the position of representative of the Commissioner of 
Insurance is not, as a matter of legislative intent, within the sweep 
of the Veterans' Tenure Act. The membership of the board of appeals 
consists of the Commissioner of Insurance, the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles and an assistant attorney general. The first two of these offi-
cers may act vicariously through designees, whose designation is clearly 
revocable. The Commissioner of Insurance, or his designated repre-
sentative, is by the statute made chairman of the board, and the board 
itself serves in the Division of Insurance. In the view of the Court, 
the requirements of the statute evidence a legislative intention to make 
the designation of a representative a personal prerogative of the com-
missioner with the expectation that the representative would serve at 
the pleasure of the commissioner and reflect his policies in the highly 
sensitive area of cancellations by insurance companies of the insurance 
required as a condition of maintaining a motor vehicle registration. 
It does not appear that the legislature could have intended the Vet-
erans' Tenure Act to negate the provisions of the prior enactment. 
§16.6. Motor vehicle insurance: Definition of insured. Nichols 
& Co. v. Travelers Insurance CO.l was a bill for a declaratory decree 
that the plaintiff Nichols was an omnibus insured under the non-
statutory bodily injury liability coverage of a Massachusetts motor 
vehicle liability policy issued by Travelers to one Barron. Judgment 
in a tort action had been had against both Nichols and Barron for in-
jury sustained by a woman struck by a bag of wool tossed to the ground 
from a truck owned by Barron to be picked up by one of the employees 
of Nichols, who was assisting in the unloading of the truck, and carried 
into the premises of Nichols. Nichols was insured under a compre-
hensive general liability policy issued by the Century Indemnity Com-
pany covering the premises, but sought to be indemnified under the 
motor vehicle policy, which contained the standard language reciting 
that commercial use of the motor vehicle "includes the loading and 
unloading thereof." 
The motor vehicle policy in question apparently was in the form 
used for a number of years in the early fifties which defined insured 
under Coverage B, the non-statutory bodily injury liability coverage, 
in the same terms as for Coverage A, the statutory coverage, i.e., "the 
unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured and also in-
cludes any other person responsible for the operation of the motor 
vehicle with the express or implied consent of the named insured." 
This provision has since been amended, and the definition of "in-
sured" for the non-statutory coverage of the Massachusettts motor 
vehicle liability policy is now expressed in the language of the Stand-
ard Provisions for Automobile Liability Policies.2 
Following its earlier decision in O'Rook v. Lloyds Casualty Co.,s in 
§16.6. 1343 Mass. 494,179 N.E.2d 593 (1962). 
2 See note on Standard Provisions Program, 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.15. 
8285 Mass. 532. 189 N.E. 571 (1934). 
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which it was held that the words "express or implied consent" primar-
ily modify not the word "operation" but the word "responsible," and 
thus that responsibility for operation of the motor vehicle together 
with possession conferred by the owner and not whether the particular 
operation was with the express or implied consent of the owner is the 
proper test, the Supreme Judicial Court denied plaintiff's petition. 
The plaintiff's employees never had possession of the motor vehicle 
nor any control of it, even though they participated in the process of 
unloading. They were not therefore responsible for the operation 
of the motor vehicle and could not become insureds under the motor 
vehicle liability policy. 
§16.7. Medical service corporation: Surgical fee schedule. In 
Massachusetts Medical Service v. Commissioner of Insurance,l the 
medical service corporation, commonly called the Blue Shield, and a 
participating surgeon appealed a final decree in the Superior Court 
dismissing a petition to revise an order of the Commissioner of In-
surance disapproving a filing of increased fees to the physicians for 
surgical services to "Plan B" subscribers, certain increased benefits to 
subscribers, and increased subscription fees. There was no question 
that subscription fees would have to be increased if the surgical fee 
schedule was increased. At issue was the proposed increase in the 
surgical fees to be paid to participating physicians. The Superior 
Court judge found that there was substantial evidence to support the 
commissioner's order. 
Every subscription certificate of the Blue Shield, whether individual 
or group, together with the rates charged therefor must be filed with 
the Commissioner of Insurance.2 Individual certificates may not be 
used without his prior approval; group certificates must be filed within 
§16.7. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 777. 182 N.E.2d 298, also noted in §12.11l supra. 
2 General Laws. c. 176A. §4, provides in part as follows: "Any medical service 
corporation may enter into. contracts with its subscribers and with participating 
physicians . • . for such medical and surgical services as may lawfully be rendered 
by them to the subscribers and their dependents, and may pay for such services. 
The form of agreement with participating physicians . . . and the rates at which 
participating physicians . . . are compensated for their services . . . shall at all 
times be subject to the written approval of the commissioner. 
"Any agreement between a medical service corporation and a person ... shall 
be considered a non-group medical service agreement. Under such an agreement 
the form of the subscription certificate and the rates charged ... to the subscribers 
shall be filed with and receive the prior approval of the commissioner. No such 
agreement shall be approved if he finds that the benefits provided therein are un-
reasonable in relation to the rate charged. nor if the rates charged are excessive. 
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. 
"Any agreement between a medical service corporation and a group of five or 
more persons or with the employer, employers or other representatives of such 
group • . • shall be considered a group medical service agreement. 
"Under such a group medical service agreement, subscription certificates and 
rates charged . . • to the subscribers shall be filed with the commissioner within 
thirty days after their effective date, and shall be subject to subsequent disapproval 
by the commissioner if he finds that the benefits provided therein are unreason-
able in relation to the rates charged, or the rates charged ate excessive, inadequate 
or unfairly discriminatory." 
8
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thirty days after their effective date and are subject to his subsequent 
disapproval. In either case, certificates must be disapproved if the 
benefits provided are unreasonable in relation to the rate charged, or 
if the rates charged are excessive, inadequate or unfairly discrimi-
natory. This test combines that fixed by the statute for individual 
accident and sickness policies issued by insurance companies generally 
and the rate approval criteria established under the Casualty and 
Surety Rate Regulatory Law.8 
Likewise, every agreement with participating physicians and the 
rates at which they are to be compensated for their services are made 
subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Insurance.4 No ex-
plicit reference is made in the statute to the standards to be applied 
by the commissioner in approving or disapproving the fee schedules. 
But the Supreme Judicial Court encountered no difficulty in con-
cluding that the essential interrelationship between the charges to 
subscribers and the compensating fees to participating physicians im-
plicitly required that the same standards be applied to both. Thus 
the fee schedule may be disapproved only if the fees are inadequate, 
excessive or unfairly discriminatory. 
The rate-regulating function is an administrative one, to which a 
hearing is appropriate. The commissioner in making his determi-
nation must apply criteria that are relevant to the purpose and effect 
of the statute. It is of scant relevance to show that many individuals 
will be affected, that insurance costs will increase for many munici-
palities and many private employers, that the cost of commercial in-
surance plans may be influenced or that the earnings of physicians are 
already relatively high. Prevailing charges for similar services in the 
community, physicians' fees in uninsured cases, increases in physicians' 
expenses since the adoption of existing fee schedules, increases in the 
cost of living indices and studies of the Blue Shield fee committee are 
all relevant. 
Inasmuch as the Commissioner of Insurance insisted that the only 
statutory limitation upon his. disapproval is that it be in the public 
interest, the Court refused to search the record for testimony which, 
if given weight, would support the commissioner's adverse decision. 
The proceedings were remanded to the commissioner with instructions 
to review the filing on the basis of the standards prescribed in the 
Court's opinion. 
§16.8. Policy conditions: Assistance and cooperation. Rose v. 
8 General Laws, c. 175, §IOS, subsection SA, provides in part as follows: "The 
commissioner may, within thirty days after the filing of a copy or form of such 
a policy [of accident and sickness insurance], disapprove such form of policy if the 
benefits provided therein are unreasonable in relation to the premium charged, or 
if it contains any provision which is unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading or de-
ceptive, or which encourages misrepresentation as to such policy." 
General Laws, c. 175A, §5(a), the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Law, 
requires that: "All rates shall be made in accordance with the following provisions: 
... 4. Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate. or unfairly discriminatory." 
4 See note 2 supra. 
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Regan1 was a bill in equity to reach and apply the obligation of 
Regan's insurer, the defendant American Employer's Insurance Com-
pany, under the non-compulsory guest coverage of a motor vehicle 
liability policy in satisfaction of separate judgments obtained by three 
individual claimants. The defendant insurer denied liability on the 
ground that the insured had breached the notice and the assistance 
and cooperation clauses of the policy. The defendant insured duly 
notified the insurer of the accident, but thereafter moved and gave no 
notice of change of address to the insurer. Unsuccessful efforts were 
made to serve the insured with writs in the three actions; in two of 
these he was subsequently defaulted for failure to appear and answer. 
The insurer learned of these defaults from the claimants' attorney, 
who had indicated a willingness to have the defaults removed. The 
insurer thereupon, without any disclaimer or reservation of rights and 
without making any effort to contact the insured, entered on his be-
half a general appearance, filed answers, had the defaults removed and 
generally assumed control of the proceedings. In the view of the 
Supreme Judicial Court there was a material breach of the policy con-
ditions by the insured, but the insurer may not take advantage of this 
breach because its general appearance made a significant and irre-
vocable change in the insured's position, giving the trial court a basis 
for jurisdiction. As with an insurer seeking to disclaim after having 
defended without any reservation of rights or disclaimer of liability, 
it would be unfair to permit the insurer to withdraw protection after 
its participation in the action had irrevocably and materially affected 
the insured's position without his knowledge or consent. Moreover, 
it is immaterial that the insured in all likelihood, upon notice prior 
to removal of default, would have authorized the general appearance 
in his behalf notwithstanding a disclaimer by the insurance company. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§16.9. Fire insurance. During the 1961 session of the General 
Court the Division of Insurance was directed by the legislature to 
make a study relative to the difficulty encountered by certain property 
owners in securing fire insurance, and the need for the creation of an 
assigned risk plan to assist such persons as are unable to obtain such 
insurance. 1 Late in December of 1961 the division filed a preliminary 
report and obtained additional time to complete its study and, in par-
ticular, to enable it to appraise the effectiveness of a voluntary All-
Industry Inspection Program developed by the insurance companies 
and to evaluate schedule rating plans for substandard dwellings 
recently approved for use in Missouri and Ohio.2 As in the city of 
Boston and other urban centers throughout the country, the larger 
§16.8. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 647. 181 N.E.2d 796. 
§16.9. 1 Resolves of 1961. c. 114. discussed in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.8. 
2 Resolves of 1962. c. lB. 
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cities of these two states have developed blighted areas with marginal, 
substandard and, in some cases, totally uninsurable properties. 
Understandably, the owners of marginal or substandard properties 
find it difficult to obtain insurance at manual rates, a difficulty sought 
to be overcome in Missouri and Ohio by the adoption of schedule 
rating plans which provide for substantial premium surcharges for 
deficiencies in heating systems, electric wiring, maintenance and the 
like. In Boston the companies undertook to evolve a solution to the 
same problem by voluntarily adopting a self-imposed obligation to 
make a physical inspection of any property before declining to insure 
such property and, if the property was found to be substandard, to 
make available to the owner in specific detail what must be done to 
the property to make it insurable. To implement this plan an in-
spection office has been established which makes immediately available 
to the companies, to insurance agents and brokers, and to property 
owners competent inspection service and objective evaluations of the 
deficiencies which inhibit the extension of fire insurance coverage. 
In its final report the Division of Insurance recommended against 
the enactment of assigned risk plan legislation. From its studies it 
was concluded that the availability of schedule rating for fire insurance 
on substandard dwellings had resulted in the writing of a very limited 
amount of such insurance. Basically, the solution to the problem lies 
not in compelling the availability of insurance, but in strict enforce-
ment of building laws, more rigid adherence to fire prevention and 
public safety codes, and vigorous promotion of urban redevelopment 
and rehabilitation programs. Meanwhile, the All-Industry Inspection 
Program has been singularly successful in making a very substantial 
volume of insurance available at manual rates in areas characterized 
by many marginal properties and high frequency of fire loss. This 
success is reflected, as noted in the division report, in (1) a substantial 
increase in the number of property inspections, (2) a constant decline 
in the rate of refusals to insure, (3) a material increase in the number 
of requests for reinspection of properties previously rejected for defi-
ciencies which have been removed, (4) a continuing decline in the 
number of requests for approval of excess rates by the division,S and 
(5) a corresponding increase in the number of requests to withdraw 
excess rates. 
The legislature accepted the findings of the Division of Insurance, 
and the bill to create an assigned risk plan failed of enactment. 
§16.10. Fire insurance: Nuclear energy. During the 1962 SURVEY 
year the insurance companies finally succeeded in persuading the legis"' 
lature to enact a statute to clarify the application of the standard fire 
policyl to loss caused by nuclear reaction, nuclear radiation and radio-
3 See 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.8. note 1. 
§16.l0. 1 General Laws, c. 175. §99, prescribes the language of the so-called 
Massachusetts Standard Fire Policy, which must be used verbatim by all insurance 
companies to insure against loss by fire or by fire and lightning to property situ-
ated within the state. 
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active contamination. The standard policy contains no definition of 
"fire," and the statute permits no editorial additions or modifications 
to the required policy language. The absence of any such definition 
raised serious questions concerning the construction which a court 
might give to the policy if faced with the necessity of determining 
whether a nuclear reaction generating a release of energy resulting in 
a blast accompanied by enormous heat and blinding light involved 
the essential elements of a fire as that term is used in the statute. 
Could it be said that damage done by nuclear radiation or radioactive 
contamination was damage "by fire"? Could it be said that the statu-
tory fire policy covers loss caused by nuclear radiation or radioactive 
particles released by an atomic reactor as a result of, or accompanied 
by, a fire in the reactor? An affirmative answer to these questions 
would cast doubt upon the ability of private insurers to pay the po-
tential losses under such policies or even to offer coverage at a rate 
which a typical property owner could pay. It has been estimated that a 
major nuclear incident resulting in radioactive contamination of a 
congested metropolitan area could produce losses in excess of the 
aggregate surplus of all fire insurance companies in the United States. 
Acts of 1962, c. 418,2 enacts with one amendment the uniform bill 
approved by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in 
December, 1958, and recommended for adoption in all states having 
a statutory fire policy. This enactment incorporates into the statute 
essentially the language of a policy endorsement issued with all fire 
policies in every state, including Massachusetts, with the formal ap-
proval of the insurance commissioners. This policy provision now 
specifically authorized by statute makes a loss not caused by fire, but 
by nuclear reaction, nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination, 
not compensable as a fire loss even though the. reactor blast or the 
radiation or contamination diffusion resulted from a fire on the prem-
ises of the reactor or in the reactor. A right of recovery remains, how-
ever, for a loss caused by fire and not by the nuclear blast as, e.g., when 
a nuclear blast causes an actual fire on the premises of the reactor 
which spreads to an adjoining property and destroys it. The amend-
ment to the uniform biIl,8 thought to be necessary in only one other 
state, is intended to give clearer expression to this latter result. 
The possibility of loss or damage from nuclear energy hazards has 
for some years been a matter of considerable concern to the insurance 
companies and to the Federal Government. The insurance companies 
in a major effort to respond to the need for exceedingly high amounts 
of coverage have developed two insurance pools, that of the stock com-
panies known as the Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association 
and that of the mutual companies known as the Mutual Atomic Energy 
Liability Underwriters. The Federal Government has adopted indem-
2 Adding new Section 99A to G.L,. c. 175. 
8 Before enactment the N.A.I.C. model bill was amended by the addition of the 
following language: "however. subject to the foregoing and all provisions of said 
policy. direct loss by fire resulting from nuclear reaction. or nuclear radiation or 
radioactive contamination is insured against by such policy," 
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nification legislation4 to provide coverage beyond the capacity of the 
private insurers. Property owners whose property is damaged or de-
stroyed by a nuclear blast or by radioactive contamination are now 
protected for such loss under the insurance afforded to the operator 
of a nuclear reactor. Such operators, licensed by the Atomic Energy 
Commission, have insurance up to $60 million from the insurance 
pools and, in addition, up to $500 million of Government indemnity. 
The Government indemnity also applies with respect to the operation 
of nuclear reactors by the Government. The liability for any such 
damage or destruction is regarded as absolute and is unaffected by the 
presence or absence of negligence on the part of the reactor operator. 
In these circumstances it is appropriate to exclude such damage or 
destruction from the coverage of policies issued to the property 
owners. 
§16.11. Liability insurance: Joint tort-feasors. Acts of 1962, c. 730, 
adds to the General Laws a new chapter1 dealing with the rights to 
contribution among joint tort-feasors. Prior to this enactment no 
right of contribution existed in Massachusetts if the person seeking 
contribution had himself been guilty of personal fault.2 With respect 
to torts committed on or after January 1, 1963, a joint tort-feasor who 
has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability may 
recover the excess over his pro rata share from the other joint tort-. 
feasor or tort-feasors. Such recovery is limited to the excess payment, 
and no joint tort-feasor is compelled to contribute more than his pro 
rata share of the common liability. A liability insurer, who has paid 
on behalf of an insured joint tort-feasor the insured's obligation in 
full or in part and has thereby discharged its full obligation as insurer, 
is subrogated to the joint tort-feasor's right of contribution to the 
extent of any payment in excess of the tort-feasor's pro rata share of 
the common liability. This right of subrogation is in addition to any 
other subrogation rights of the insurer. 
The new law preserves the established right of a joint tort-feasor 
without personal fault who has paid the injured party to indemnity 
from the person or persons who caused the injury.s It is specifically 
provided that such a person's right to indemnity is unimpaired and 
the person owing indemnity is not entitled to contribution from the 
indemnitee for any portion of his indemnity obligation. In deter-
mining the pro rata shares of tort-feasors in the entire liability their 
relative degrees of fault are not considered, but the principles of 
equity applicable to contribution generally apply.4 An action to en-
force contribution must be brought within one year after the judg-
ment has become final. 
Heretofore a release of one of two or more persons liable in tort for 
4 Price·Anderson Act, 71 Stat. 576, 42 U.s.C. §2210 (1958), as amended through 
Pub. L. 87·206, 75 Stat. 479 (1961). 
§16.11. 1 G.L., c. 2l11B. See §lI.8 supra. 
2 Churchill v. Holt, IlIl Mass. 67 (1881). 
s Hollywood Barbecue Co. v. Morse, lII4 Mass. lI68, 50 N.E.2d 55 (l94l1). 
4 Tait v. Downey, 267 Mass. 422,166 N.E. 857 (1929). 
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the same injury released all.1i Under the new statute a release of one 
tort-feasor does not discharge the others unless the release so provides. 
However, the claim against the others shall be reduced by the amount 
paid under the release, and the tort-feasor to whom the release is given 
will be discharged from all liability for contribution to any of the 
others. 
§16.12. Liability insurance: Wrongful death. Acts of 1962, c. 306, 
amends the Wrongful Death Statute1 to increase the minimum damage 
limits for wrongful death from $2000 to $3000 and the maximum 
damage limits from $20,000 to $30,000. These increased amounts 
apply only to actions for death resulting from injuries sustained or 
accidents occurring on or after January I, 1963.2 
§16.I3. Accident and health insurance: Non-profit service plans. 
Two new chapters were added during the 1962 SURVEY year to the 
General Laws authorizing the formation of dental service corpora-
tions1 and optometric service corporations.2 Such corporations may 
be created to provide respectively dental and optometric services under 
the non-profit service plan whereby the cost of service to subscribers 
and covered dependents is paid by the corporation to participating 
dentists or optometrists. Each of the statutes follows essentially the 
provisions of the statute authorizing the medical service corporationS 
popularly called the Blue Shield. It is noteworthy that unlike the 
medical service corporation statute, the new statutes require prior 
approval by the Commissioner of Insurance of the subscription forms 
and of the rates charged to the subscribers.. It is also significant that 
these statutes refer throughout to "premiums" charged to subscribers, 
reflecting a recognition of the fact that the service plans have become 
increasingly more akin to insurance plans, losing much of the original 
concept of service plans. As with the medical service plans, the dental 
and optometric service plans must file their subscription agreements for 
approval and they may be disapproved by the Commissioner of Insur-
ance if he finds that the services offered are unreasonable in relation to 
the premium charged, or if the premiums charged are excessive, inade-
quate or unfairly discriminatory. A new and additional test is es-
tablished under the optometric service plans statute which requires 
disapproval if the services offered are unreasonable in relation to "eco-
nomic practicality of providing for such prepaid services." /I It will 
be interesting to see what meaning is given to these words and how 
this test may someday be applied in testing the approvability of a 
forms and rate filing. 
Ii Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 97 N.E. 6118 (1912). 
§16.l2. 1 C.L., c. 229, §2. See §!I.6 supra. 
2 For discussion of this statute in the conflict of laws area, see §8.1 supra. 
§16.l!l. 1 Acts of 1962, c. 714, adding C.L., c. 176E. 
2 Acts of 1962, c. 774, adding C.L., c. 176F. 
S C.L., c. 176B . 
• See §16.7 supra, note 2. 
Ii C.L., c. 176F, §6. 
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§16.14. Accident and health insurance: Dependent's benefits. Acts 
of 1962, c. 634, amends the individual accident and sickness policy 
provisions law1 and the group disability policy provisions law2 to 
require such policies while in force to continue benefits for a dependent 
child beyond the age at which such dependent child's eligibility for 
benefits would otherwise terminate if the child is mentally or physically 
incapable of earning his own living. This additional coverage is con-
ditioned upon submission to the insurer of proof of the dependent 
child's incapacity within thirty-one days of the attainment of the ter-
mination age specified by the policy and will continue so long as the 
incapacity continues. 
§16.15. Health insurance: Mass 65. In several states, notably 
Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York, an effective device for 
making group health insurance benefits generally available to the 
elderly has been developed by the insurance companies operating as 
an association of joint underwriters. In each state a relatively gener-
ous grant of coverage is offered to residents of the state sixty-five years 
of age or older and to the spouses of such residents at premium rates 
which are supportable only if a large group of persons are insured 
without subjecting the insurers to serious adverse selection. Coverage 
may be obtained without medical examination provided application 
is made by those already eligible during a short, widely publicized and 
statewide enrollment period, and by those who subsequently become 
eligible within a brief period following the sixty-fifth birthday. Appli-
cation for coverage and premium payments may be made either by the 
elderly person or by a member of his family, who may now or in the 
future bear the responsibility for care of the elderly person. 
In each state legislation authorizing such joint underwriting by 
insurance companies was required. In Massachusetts, Acts of 1962, 
c. 392,1 enables two or more companies authorized to transact a health 
insurance business, either jointly in their own names or in the name 
of a voluntary unincorporated association, to issue a policy of group 
insurance under which each company is severally liable for a specified 
percentage of the insured risks. The companies may fix premium 
rates and agree upon policy provisions, commission schedules and such 
other matters as are necessary to make possible a uniform offering. 
Policy forms, commission schedules and premium rates are required 
to be filed with the Commissioner of Insurance, who may after appro-
priate notice and hearing disapprove the policy forms if he finds them 
to be unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading or deceptive, or the pre-
mium rates if he finds them to be excessive, inadequate or unfairly 
discriminatory. Both the Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions 
Law2 and the Group Accident and Health Policy LawS are made in-
§16.l4. 1 G.L., c. 175, §108, specifically paragraph (a) of subdivision 2. 
2Id. §llO, specifically subdivision D. 
§16.15. 1 Adding new Section llOC to G.L., c. 175. 
S G.L., c. 175, §108, discussed in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.11. 
8 G.L., c. 175, §llO. 
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applicable to such policy forms. Any agent or broker licensed to place 
health insurance may, without further licensing, solicit insurance for 
any association formed under the authority of this statute. 
It seems possible that widespread use of this method of making 
privately underwritten group health insurance benefits available to 
persons who have reached or passed what has come to be regarded as 
the normal retirement age, who are as a consequence generally no 
longer eligible for benefits under established group insurance plans, 
and whose actual or potential state of health makes difficult the pur-
chase of individual health insurance policies, will substantially reduce 
the need for government-sponsored and tax-supported medical care 
programs. Whether the ever-increasing volume of health insurance 
benefits being afforded by private insurance companies for all age 
groups, including the older age groups, will relieve the political pres-
sure for such governmental programs remains to be seen. In the cur-
rent political activity scant attention is being paid to the fact that the 
breadth of coverage, the competence of insurance specialists in the 
administration of insurance programs and the capacity to match pro-
tection to need which characterize privately underwritten insurance 
is not likely to be duplicated by any governmental agency. 
§16.16. Motor vehicle insurance: Cancellation. Acts of 1962, c. 
178,1 restricts the right of appeal from the cancellation of a compul-
sory motor vehicle liability policy or bond to the Board of Appeal on 
Motor Vehicle Liability Policies or Bonds to exclude the cancellation 
for non-payment of premium of a policy insuring a motor vehicle 
registered as a taxicab or for public livery use. 
§16.17. Policy forms: Departmental approval. Under the applica-
ble provisions of the insurance law heretofore in effect no policy pro-
viding coverage against loss or damage caused by hazards specified in 
more than one of the kinds of insurance a company is authorized to 
write,1 no policy of individual accident and sickness insurance,2 no 
policy of life or endowment insurance or contract for the payment 
of an annuity or pure endowment,S no group life insurance policy4 
and no group annuity contractll could be issued until it had been on 
file with the Commissioner of Insurance for a period of thirty days 
unless within that period he approved the policy in writing. Neither 
could such a policy be issued if the commissioner notified the com-
pany in writing that in his opinion the policy did not comply with 
the laws of the Commonwealth. The statutes further specified that 
such disapproval action was subject to review by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
§16.l6. 1 Amending G.L., c. 175, §l1!ID. 
§16.17. 1 G.L., c. 175, §22A (regulating approval of combination policies) and 
§47 (defining the kinds of insurance which companies may be authorized to write). 
2 G.L., c. 175, §l08. 
SId. §l!l2. 
4Id. §l!l4. 
Ii Id. §l!l2B. 
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Acts of 1962, c. 426,6 expands each of the existing approval sections 
and specifies in considerable detail the filing and approval procedure 
and the method of obtaining judicial review of a withdrawal of ap-
proval by the commissioner. Under the new provisions the commis-
sioner may by written notice to the filing company extend for an addi-
tional thirty days the thirty-day period specified in the prior law. At 
expiration of the original filing period or any extension thereof the 
policy is deemed approved unless it has within the applicable period 
been affirmatively approved or disapproved. Affirmative approval will 
constitute a waiver of any unexpired portion of the applicable filing 
period.7 
1£ a disapproved form of policy is resubmitted to the commissioner 
within thirty days of receipt of the notice of disapproval, such resub-
mitted form may not be issued until it has been on file for a period 
of thirty days unless within that period it is approved in writing, or 
if within that period it is disapproved in writing. At the expiration 
of such period the resubmitted form is deemed approved unless prior 
to the expiration of the period it has been affirmatively approved or 
disapproved.8 
The commissioner may give written notice to the filing company 
of intent to withdraw approval of a form of policy previously affirma-
tively approved or deemed to have been approved and fixing a place 
and date of a hearing, which may not be less than twenty days from 
date of notice to the filing company. Following the required hearing 
the commissioner must give written notice to the filing company of 
any decision to withdraw approval, and after the expiration of thirty 
days following receipt of this notice it is unlawful for the company 
to issue the disapproved policy form. The filing company may, within 
twenty days following the filing of a memorandum thereof with the 
commissioner, petition the Supreme Judicial Court for a review of 
the action of the commissioner.9 Unless otherwise directed by the 
Court the commissioner's order will remain in effect pending the final 
decision of the Court, which reviews all questions in accordance with 
the standards prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act.10 
§16.18. Mutual companies: Dividend classifications. As the Ameri-
can economy expands, as the volume of international trade increases, 
as the value and destructiveness of vehicles of travel and transport 
multiply, as nuclear energy and its application are further developed 
and as man moves deeper into the space age, the need. and demand 
for more and more insurance at higher and higher limits grow apace. 
Many risks today require amounts of insurance which are beyond the 
capacity of a single insurance company to satisfy. Moreover, this in-
surance is required on hazard potentials which are increasingly diffi-
6 Adding to C.L., c. 175, new Sections 193F, 193C and 193H. 
7 C.L., c. 175, §193F. 
8 Id. §193C. 
9Id. §193H. 
10 Id., c. 30A, §14, d. (8). 
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cult to define, more often than not cannot be measured on the basis 
of past experience and in some cases may even be unknown. To make 
such insurance available requires the collaborative efforts of multiple 
insurers. 
Acts of 1962, c. 397, amends the section of the insurance law which 
regulates the dividend practices of mutual property and casualty com-
panies.1 By this amendment these companies are authorized to classify 
separately for dividend purposes policies insuring risks shared with 
other insurers and to pay a different rate of dividend from, but not in 
excess of, the rate of dividend which would otherwise be payable if 
the policies were not separately classified. This separate classification 
may be applied to policies covering (1) credit risks arising from foreign 
trade, (2) loss of or damage to aircraft, missiles or spacecraft, (3) lia-
bility arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of aircraft, 
missiles or spacecraft, (4) products liability on aircraft, missiles or 
spacecraft, and (5) other extrahazardous risks arising out of the manu-
facture or development for national defense of products which involve 
potential catastrophic losses and which cannot be evaluated by prior 
experience. No such separate classification may include coverage for 
liability under any workmen's compensation or occupational disease 
law. 
§16.19. Insurance companies. Acts of 1962, c. 179, further modifies 
the Administrative Procedure Act! to exempt from the hearing re-
quirements of the act a refusal by the Commissioner of Insurance to 
renew the license of a foreign insurance company upon the grounds 
of insolvency, capital stock or guaranty fund impairment, or contin-
gent assets or surplus deficiency. An earlier amendment had exempted 
from the requirement of hearing the revocation of such a license.2 
Acts of 1962, c. 57, amends the statutory provision to require the 
calling of a special meeting of the members of a mutual property or 
casualty company upon the written request of at least .5 percent of 
the members.s Heretofore such a request by twenty members sufficed 
to obtain the call of a special meeting. 
§16.l8. 1 G.L., c. 175, §80. 
§16.19. 1 G.L., c. 30A, §13, added by Acts of 1954, c. 681, §l. 
2 Acts of 1960, c. 245, noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.l4. 
8 Amending G.L., c. 175, §77. 
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